Despite economists' nearly universal support for free trade policies, the general public has serious reservations about free trade. To understand this opposition, one must understand the preferences of individuals as they relate to the policy choices of policymakers. Ideally, one would like to know how these preferences differ across regions because legislators who represent their constituents in the U.S. Congress cast the actual votes on trade policies. The present study produces estimates by state of trade preferences linked directly to individual preferences. Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) found that the lower the skill level of a worker, the stronger the support for additional trade restrictions. I generate estimates by state for 1992 and 1996 using Scheve and Slaughter's estimates. The estimates are generated in two steps. First, an average level of educational attainment for each state is constructed. Second, this educational attainment variable is inserted into Scheve and Slaughter's estimate of the relationship between educational attainment and an individual's support for additional trade restrictions to produce an average probability of state support for additional trade restrictions.
INTRODUCTION
Despite economists' nearly universal support for free trade policies, the general public has serious reservations about free trade. To understand the opposition to free trade, one must understand the preferences of individuals as they relate to the policy choices available to policymakers. A recent study by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) , which focuses on individual preferences, found that the lower the skill level of a worker, the stronger the support for new trade barriers.
Scheve and Slaughter's result is consistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin trade model in which the United States is well endowed with skilled labor. In such a world, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, policy changes removing international trade barriers that stimulate inter-industry trade would tend to increase the incomes of skilled labor.
Meanwhile, trade liberalization would likely be detrimental to the incomes of unskilled labor.
1 As a result, the incomes of unskilled labor would fall further behind those of skilled labor.
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In the context of trade policy determination, one would like to know how these preferences differ across regions because legislators who represent their constituents in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives cast the actual votes on trade policies. By using Scheve and Slaughter's estimates for individuals, I generate estimates by state for 1 Factors other than those based on economic self-interest might come into play. See Coughlin (2002) for a discussion of evidence highlighting the potential importance of other considerations. 2 Since the mid-1970s, Sapir (2000) notes an increasing wage disparity between skilled and unskilled workers in the United States. In addition, between 1973 and 1997 the median real weekly earnings of male, full-time workers declined from $700 to $600 using 1997 dollars. 3 To my knowledge, no one has produced regional estimates of trade preferences linked directly to individual preferences.
To set the stage for my analysis, in the next section I review the aspects of Scheve and Slaughter's analysis that provide the foundation for my estimates. In the subsequent section, I produce estimates of the average probability that a region supports additional trade restrictions. These estimates are examined to see whether the support for additional restrictions by a specific region is associated with the support by its neighbors. I complete this section by generating estimates of the percentage of a region's population likely to support additional trade restrictions. To generate evidence on the usefulness of my estimates, in the final section of the body of this paper I examine voting by U.S.
Senators on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A summary completes the paper. Rodrik (1995) 6 Regressions using occupation wage, an alternative measure of skill, as the independent variable produced additional support for the importance of skill levels in determining trade-policy preferences. 7 The expected value of an individual's trade opinion is defined as follows: E(Trade Opinion I ) = Pr(Trade Opinion I = 1|π I ) = π I , where I indexes each observation and π I equals the probability that an individual supports trade restrictions. Using the logistic distribution, π I = 1/(1 + exp(-x I β)). 8 See Rodrik (1995) , Coughlin et al. (1989) , and Bohara and Kaempfer (1991) for additional references and analyses dealing with this issue. For example, Bohara and Kaempfer found that U.S. tariffs were Grangercaused by unemployment, real gross national product, and inflation.
INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE RESTRICTIONS

SUPPPORT FOR ADDITIONAL TRADE RESTRICTIONS: STATE ESTIMATES
Producing state estimates is straightforward. An estimate for average educational attainment in each region was generated for 1992 and 1996. This estimate was then used to calculate an average probability using the estimated equations in Table 1 .
State Estimates of Educational Attainment
Based on the March supplement of the Current Population Survey, I created an average level of education for each state. First, the Survey's educational attainment variable was converted to measures of completed education in years. The conversion assumptions are listed in Table 2 . Not surprisingly, I think all the assumptions are justified; however, I would like to make a few remarks about some specific assumptions.
Responses of "None," "First-Fourth Grade," "Fifth-Sixth Grade," and "SeventhEighth Grade" were all assigned eight years of completed education. A possibility of upward bias exists. In light of the small percentage of responses in the first three of these four categories; however, this assumption does not affect the estimates materially.
Responses of "Ninth Grade," "Tenth Grade," and "Eleventh Grade" were assigned 9, 10, and 11 years of completed education. In many cases the students likely dropped out at some point in the following school year, so it is possible that there is some downward bias in the educational attainment measure. Similar to the preceding case, the bias is likely to be quite small. "Some College, but No Degree" was assigned 13 years. In this case the bias could be in either direction. Some students leave before completing successfully their first year of college, while others leave after completing more than one year. Another source of potential bias arises due to the possibility that some individuals have multiple master's degrees or a master's degree and a doctorate in different fields. In both cases the assignments of 18 and 20 years, respectively, understates the years of completed education; however, the degree of bias is likely to be small because of the small percentage of the population falling into these categories.
Given the preceding assumptions, the focus was restricted to people 25 and older.
Then, using the weights of each category based on the Survey's results, I calculated a weighted average years of completed education for each state. 
State Estimates of Support for Additional Trade Restrictions
Inserting the estimates for educational attainment into the equations listed in Table 1 produces the results for individual states, plus the District of Columbia, listed in Table 3 . A ranking of the estimated probabilities from highest (1) to lowest (51) Table 3 was 12.77. Another way to see the difference is that 92 percent of the survey sample had a high school degree or more in 1992, while in the United States as a whole 79 percent had a high school degree or more.
An alternative presentation of the results for 1992 (Table 3 ) is contained in Figure   1 . The map, based on quartiles, reveals a clustering of protectionist sentiment. In other words, a state with a high degree of protectionist sentiment is likely to be located near other states with high degrees of protectionist sentiment and a state with a low degree is likely to be located near other states with low degrees of protectionist sentiment. One way to measure this spatial autocorrelation is by Moran's I. This statistic, which in most cases ranges from -1 to +1, is 0.5 in 1992. Such a value indicates a high degree of positive spatial autocorrelation.
This clustering of protectionist sentiment reflects the fact that educational attainment tends to be similar for clusters of states. Figure 1 shows that the South tends to have the highest levels of average support for additional trade restrictions. These results are consistent with the existing, albeit scarce, information on trade opinions for specific regions. For example, Sarpolus (2000) found that respondents from Southern states were less likely to approve of free trade agreements than were respondents from other states.
Turning to the results for 1996 presented in Table 3 Another way to use the regression results of Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) is to calculate the educational attainment level that would produce a probability of 0.5 for supporting additional trade restrictions. 10 These levels are 16.8 years of education for 1992 and 14.4 years for 1996. Next, calculate the percentage of a region's population that produces a probability of 0.5 or higher. Obviously, the rest of a region's population can be viewed as opposing additional trade restrictions. These percentages are presented in 
STATE TRADE POLICY OPINIONS AND VOTING ON NAFTA
A reasonable question is whether the preceding estimates contribute to knowledge about voting on trade policy. To generate evidence on the usefulness of the estimates reported in Table 3 In the present illustration, I rely on a model by Baldwin and Magee (2000) . 12 In Table 5 . 13 Generally speaking, labor interests opposed NAFTA because of concerns that NAFTA would have adverse effects on the jobs and earnings of labor, especially those with low skills. On the other hand, business interests supported NAFTA because of the opportunities associated with larger markets and the potential reductions in costs due to gains in efficiency.
The results show that ideology was not a statistically significant determinant of voting by senators on NAFTA. The results for two proxies are reported. AFL-CIO, an ideological rating by the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations is expected to be related negatively to votes in favor of NAFTA.
11 Examples include Baldwin and Magee (2000) , Kang and Greene (1999) , Kamdar and Gonzalez (1998) , Thorbecke (1997) , Conybeare and Zinkula (1996) , and Kahane (1996) . 12 Special thanks are due Christopher Magee for providing data and programs. 13 The estimates of the contributions equations are omitted. See Baldwin and Magee (2000, Table 6 ). Measures for the economic interests of the senators' constituents generally performed as expected. Union, which is the private-sector unionization rate by state, is a statistically significant determinant. As expected, it is related negatively to votes in favor of NAFTA. Export ratio, which is the ratio of state employment in industries in which the United States is a net exporter to state employment in industries in which the United
Chamber of Commerce
States in a net importer, is also a statistically significant determinant. As expected, it is related positively to votes in favor of NAFTA. No high school degree, which is the fraction of a state's 25 and older population without a high school diploma, is not a statistically significant determinant. This measure of low skill workers is expected to be related negatively to support for NAFTA; however, the estimates do not reveal this expected relationship. Finally, Textiles, which is the share of a state's total employment accounted for by its textiles industry, is a statistically significant determinant. As expected, larger shares of employment in textiles are associated with increased opposition to NAFTA. 
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, voting on trade-policy issues is likely to be related to the individual preferences of the constituents that a legislator represents. To date, however, in voting model studies the preferences of the constituents were inferred based on their economic interests rather than generated directly. Using research by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) that generates information on individual trade-policy preferences, I produced estimates of 
